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Double Jeopardy Analysis Comes
Home: The "Same Conduct" Standard
in Grady v. Corbin
INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment's protection against double jeopardy "for
the same offense"' has given rise to one of the most confused
areas of constitutional law in the history of United States jurispru-
dence.2 The principal point of contention has been the meaning of
the phrase "same offense. ' 3 Recently the Supreme Court decided
Grady v Corbin,4 a case that defined the standard for determining
what constitutes double jeopardy in the context of successive pro-
secutions by the state on different charges arising out of the same
incident.5 This Comment examines the significance of the decision
in Corbin.
Part I of this Comment surveys the line of "same offense"
cases leading up to Corbin and defines the issues addressed in the
Corbin holding. 6 Part II sets out the factual background and
holding of Corbin, Part III considers the theoretical clarifications
U.S. Co NsT. amend. V
2 In a frequently quoted metaphor, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist described the
exisfing case law on the subject as "a veritable Sargasso Sea" in Ins majority opimon for
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). See generally Thomas, Multiple
Puntshments for the Same Offense: The Analysis After Missouri v. Hunter, or Don Quixote,
the Sargasso Sea, and the Gordian Knot, 62 WAsH. U.L.Q. 79, 79 (1984) (discussion of
various judicial descriptions of double jeopardy confusion).
3 See, e.g., Thomas, A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment, 47 U. Prrr. L. Rv.
1, 11 (1985); Thomas, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827,
847-850; Note, State v. Hurst: Does Double Jeopardy Include a Double Standard?, 66
N.C.L. Ray. 1191, 1195-1203 (1988); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YA.LE L.J. 262, 267-277
(1965).
- U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
This Comment does not address the issue of successive state and federal prosecutions
for related offenses. For a discussion of the "dual sovereignty" doctrine, see Lee, The Dual
Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: In the Wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority, 22 NEw ENG. L. R-v. 31 (1987).
6 See infra notes 12-67 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
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in the case," evaluates the holding from a policy standpoint,9 and
addresses the questions raised by the dissenting opimons.' 0 This
Comment concludes that although the broad protection afforded
by Corbin may have some undesirable consequences in view of the
public interest in law enforcement, the Court's decision is legally
sound in light of recent precedent and historical understanding."
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY BACKGROUND: "SAME OFFENSE"
The fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause 2 has its origin
in common-law pleas that barred a second prosecution after a prior
conviction or acquittal on a charge identical in both fact and legal
formulation. 13 It is reasonable to suppose that "offense" as used
by the drafters of the amendment referred to the rather static
common-law offenses of which one might have been convicted in
1791.' 4 Such an interpretation of the Constitutional text, however,
has long been out of favor with the Supreme Court,'5 as the
development of statutory crimes has significantly increased the
state's ability to obtain convictions by defining new "offenses"
through legislation that can provide for numerous "crimes with
overlapping coverages."16
A. Pearce: The Interests Protected by the Clause
In North Carolina v Pearce,17 the Court articulated three dis-
tinct interests protected by the double jeopardy clause. Two of
I See infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
t0 See infra notes 122-59 and accompanying text.
" See mfra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
,2 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb " U.S. CoNsT. amend. V
,1 See Grady v. Corbin, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2098-2100 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (discussion of pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit).
4 Justice Scalia appears to make this assumption in his dissent. See id. at 2098.
Professor Thomas, however, points out that no historical evidence exists as to the ratifiers'
actual intended meaning for "same offense." See Thomas, The Prohibition of Successive
Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IowA L. REv. 323, 330
(1986).
,1 Thomas, supra note 14, at 331.
16 Id. at 397 (footnote omitted). In 1791, "[t]here was no need to distinguish between
offense and conduct because the two were coextensive. Although it is unlikely that the
drafters thought specifically in terms of prohibiting reprosecution based on the same
conduct, that was the effect of common-law double jeopardy principles in the eighteenth
century." Id. at 397-99.
27 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S.
794 (1989)).
[VOL. 79
1990-91] DouBLE JEOPARDY
these recalled the common-law pleas, protecting "against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal [and] against a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction." 18 The
third interest insured "against multiple punishment for the same
offense." 19 The Court in a later case expressed a recognition that,
in addition, "[w]here successive prosecutions are at stake, the
guarantee serves 'a constitutional policy of finality for the defen-
dant's benefit.""' 2 Tis enumeration of interests provides a "guid-
ing light" by which to judge the Supreme Court's evolving double
jeopardy jurisprudence, but sheds no direct light on the meaning
of "same offense."
B. Development of the Blockburger "Same-Offense" Test
Various tests have been suggested for defining "same offense"
for double jeopardy purposes. The Supreme Court explicitly disa-
vowed the "identical statutory offense" 21 test in Ex parte Nielsen,22
rejecting the proposition that the malleable statutory crimes should
be accorded the same definitional deference as the more rigid
common-law offenses. 23 In its subsequent search for a standard to
accommodate the shift toward the legislative definition of offenses,
the Court decided Gavieres v United States24 according to the
"same evidence' ' 2" test. In Gavieres, the Court ruled that two
" North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
" Id. The Court has held, in the context of a single tnal, that a legislature may
impose cumulative pumshments for violations of two separate statutes occurring in a single-
criminal transaction. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 365 (1983). This Comment does
not directly address the issues presented in Hunter For a thorough treatment of that case,
see Thomas, supra note 2.
2 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 479 (1971)).
21 See Lee, supra note 5, at 34 (brief description of the "identical statutory offense"
test and its failings).
- 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
" "[WIhere, as in this case, a person has been tried and convicted for a crime which
has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time tned for one of those
incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ex parte Nielsen, 131
U.S. 176, 188 (1889). Since neither of the two offenses in Nielsen consisted of conduct
entirely included in the definition of the other, this early analysis tends to resemble the
"necessary element" test. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
- 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (affirrmng conviction for insulting police officer after prior
conviction for indecent public behavior).
23 The Corbin Court points out that the term "same evidence" is misleading to the
extent that the test it describes is not an 'actual evidence' test [which] would prevent the
government from introducing in a subsequent prosecution any evidence that was introduced
in a preceding prosecution," but rather focuses on statutory elements. Corbmn, 110 S. Ct.
at 2093 n.12.
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offenses are the same only where the same evidence will sustain
both convictions. 26 The Court noted that "[w]hile it is true that
the conduct of the accused was one and the same, two offenses
resulted, each of which had an element not embraced in the other." 27
The Gavieres formulation underlay the rule announced in
Blockburger v United States.28 In Blockburger, a defendant was
convicted of two related federal narcotics offenses at a single tnal;
cumulative sentences were imposed. 29 The Court held that such
cumulative punishment does not constitute double jeopardy0 and
cited Gavieres for the proposition that "where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provi-
sions, the test [for different offenses] is whether each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."' 3'
Thus, a single narcotics sale could be punished cumulatively under
both a statute prohibiting the sale of drugs not in their original
package and a statute prohibiting the sale of drugs not pursuant
to a written order of the buyer 32 The former statute, and not the
latter, would require proof that the drugs were not in their original
package; the latter, and not the former, would require proof of
the absence of a written order.
Under Blockburger, if Statute I requires proof of elements A,
B, and C, and Statute II requires proof of elements A, B, C, and
D, there is a double jeopardy violation in imposing cumulative
sentences. If, however, Statute I consists of A, B, and C, and
Statute II of A, B, and D, a cumulative sentence for violating both
statutes is not a violation. Thus, by declining to extend double
jeopardy protection to cumulative punishments in all situations, 33
the Court laid down a rule in Blockburger that became the standard
for cumulative-pumshment cases in a single-prosecution setting.3 4
6 Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343 (1911) (citing Burton v. United States,
202 U.S. 344, 381 (1906)).
17 Id. at 345.
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
29 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 301 (1932).
Id. at 304.
Id. (citing Gavieres, 220 U.S. at 342).
32 Id.
11 "The plain meaning of the provision is that each offense is subject to the penalty
prescribed; and, if that be too harsh, the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not
by judicial legislation under the guise of construction." Id. at 305.
34 See, e.g., Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (list of cases employing
Blockburger test).
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C. Ashe v Swenson: Another Protected Interest Discovered and
a New "Same-Offense" Test Proposed
Less than a year after deciding to apply the double jeopardy
restriction to prosecutions in state courts35 through the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause,36 the Court determined in Ashe
v Swenson37 that a federal principle of collateral estoppel "is
embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeop-
ardy ",38 Without mentiomng Blockburger,39 the majority held that
a man who had been acquitted in a prosecution for robbing one
of six poker players could not be prosecuted subsequently for the
robbery of another player in the same poker game. 40 The "issue
of ultimate fact [previously] determined by a valid and final judg-
ment" was involved in proving the defendant's identity as one of
the robbers in Ashe; an issue thus determined "cannot again be
litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. '" 4' The
Court concluded that "after a jury determined by its verdict that
the petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State could [not]
constitutionally hale him before a new jury to litigate that issue
again.' '42
While the majority introduced this collateral estoppel principle
into its constitutional analysis, Justice Brennan, in his concurring
opimon, advocated the "same transaction" standard, a new test
for the "same offense." ' 43 Brennan expressed his view that "the
Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in most
limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a
See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
31 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
3' Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970).
39 Chief Justice Burger, dissenting m Ashe, fiercely attacked the majority for ignoring
Blockburger, "the accepted offense-defining rule [,] to reach its decision m this case. What
[the Court] has done is to superimpose on the same-evidence test a new and novel collateral-
estoppel gloss." Id. at 464 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger referred to this use of collateral
estoppel as "a strange mutant" and revealed certain flaws in the reasoning behind it. See
id. at 464-65. Noting that the Court lifted a key phrase in its analysis, "run the gauntlet,"
out of the context where it appeared in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)
(disallowing retrial on same first-degree murder charge after defendant secured new trial
following conviction for second-degree murder), the Chief Justice also accused the majority
of "decision by slogan." See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 465.
-o Ashe, 397 U.S. at 447.
41 Id. at 443 (issue of ultimate fact was whether defendant was one of the robbers at
that poker game; that issue could not be reopened in the subsequent prosecution).
-2 Id. at 446.
41 Id. at 448 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence,
episode, or transaction."" Calling the "same evidence" test "in-
tolerable, ' 45 Brennan argued for a policy "against vexatious mul-
tiple prosecutions" and in favor of judicial economy" to support
his version of the "same transaction" test. Under the "same-
transaction" formula, a defendant who had already been prose-
cuted for Offense I (with elements A, B, and C) could not, if both
offenses occurred in the same criminal transaction, thereafter be
prosecuted for Offense II (with elements X, Y, and Z).47 Although
some states have adopted similar formulations by judicial decision"
or by statute,49 the "same transaction" test has never commanded
a majority of the Supreme Court.50
D. Brown and Vitale: A Source of Fragmentation
In the years leading up to Corbin, Supreme Court precedent
on successive prosecutions became difficult to follow. In Brown v
Ohio,5 ' the Court, relying on the authority of Ex parte Nielsen and
the Blockburger test, stated that the double jeopardy implications
of prosecution for a lesser included offense remained the same
even if the lesser offense were tried pnor to the more serious
offense.52 Thus, if a defendant were prosecuted first for the lesser
included offense, a subsequent prosecution for the more serious
offense would be barred53 because under Blockburger "each pro-
vision [would not require] proof of an additional fact which the
other [did] not.' '4
" Id. at 453-54.
4 See id. at 457.
46 See id. at 454.
47 Brennan suggested United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-726 (1966),
as a model for what constitutes the "same transaction." See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 454; see
generally Stream, Case Against Splitting Criminal Prosecutions: Fifth Amendment and the
Brennan Doctrine, 183 N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (discussion of history and
rationale of "same transaction" test and its future prospects).
,' See Thomas, supra note 14, at 377 n.332.
'9 Id. at 378 n.333.
-1 "We have steadfastly refused to adopt the 'single transaction' view of the Double
Jeopardy Clause." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985).
s 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
See id. at 168.
3 This proposition was mere dictum in Brown because the prosecutions occurred m
the reverse order. Id.
" Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. The Brown Court noted an exception where "the
State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional
facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite
the exercise of due diligence." Brown, 432 U.S. at 169 n.7.
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Three years later, in Illinois v. Vitale,55 the Court declined an
opportunity to extend the Brown reasoning to a broader protection.
The defendant, a motorist, had been convicted of a careless failure
to reduce speed.5 6 When the state prosecuted him on manslaughter
charges arising from the same incident, the Supreme Court of
Illinois found a double jeopardy violation in that "the lesser of-
fense, failing to reduce speed, requires no proof beyond that which
is necessary for conviction of the greater, involuntary manslaugh-
ter. ' 57 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the
state never did "concede that its manslaughter charge will or must
rest on proof of a reckless failure to slow . [but rather insisted]
that manslaughter by automobile need not involve any element of
failing to reduce speed."58 Since the lesser offense was not "always
a necessary element" of the greater, the Court held the offenses
not necessarily the same for double jeopardy purposes.59
Some confusion resulted from the Vitale opimon. 60 One source
of the confusion was a dictum in Vitale which stated that, if on
remand the state should concede that it would "find it necessary
to prove a failure to slow or to rely on conduct necessarily involving
such failure," then the conduct for wich Vitale had been convicted
would be a "necessary element" of the greater offense and there-
fore "hus claim of double jeopardy would be substantial under
Brown and our later decision m Harris v Oklahoma. "61
It was suggested that the Court was developing a "necessary
element" test along the lines of Nielsen, under which "offenses
are the 'same' if the same conduct is required to satisfy a necessary
, 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 412 (1980).
In re Vitale, 375 N.E.2d 87, 91 (Ill. 1978), vacated, 447U.S. 410 (1980).
Vitale, 447 U.S. at 418.
59 Id. at 419-20.
60 Over the objections of three dissenters, the Court declined to address and clarify
Vitale in Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 33 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (petition
for certiorari on double jeopardy issue granted; judgment affirmed on other grounds).
61 Vitale, 447 U.S. at 420. Hams v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682 (1977), held that,
where proof of the underlying felony is necessary to a conviction for felony murder, one
convicted of felony murder cannot thereafter be prosecuted for the underlying felony.
Justice Scalia rightly points out in Corbin that Harris gives no support to the dictum in
Vitale because "It]he felony murder statute by definition incorporated all of the elements
of the underlying felony charged; thus the later prosecution (rather than, as in Brown, the
earlier conviction) involved a lesser included offense." Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2102 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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element of each crime.' ' 62 A disagreement arose among the lower
federal courts interpreting Vitale:63 the Sixth Circuit held that a
"modification of the Blockburger test" had occurred under which
cumulative pumshments could violate the double jeopardy clause
if the "statutes have a single deterrent purpose";" the Ninth Circuit
"read Vitale as a tacit endorsement of the view that the Blockbur-
ger test, and nothing more, governs all post-conviction prosecu-
tions." 65 Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Vitale had
"changed govermng double jeopardy law to permit a defendant to
establish a substantial, and apparently dispositive, claim of double
jeopardy merely by showing that the State actually relied on the
same evidence to prove both crimes."66 Thus several contentious
questions remained unanswered. What was the effect of Vitale on
double jeopardy law9 What, indeed, was the role of the Blockbur-
ger test in finding double jeopardy violations? Was the dominant
double jeopardy analysis adequately protecting the interests served
by the clause? What did the future hold for Justice Brennan's
"same-transaction" test? In 1990, with substantial changes in Court
membership after Vitale,67 it was uncertain what path double jeop-
ardy jurisprudence would take.
II. T DEcisioN IN GRADY v. CoRBI
On October 3, 1987, Thomas J. Corbin drove his automobile
across a double yellow line on a highway in New York and struck
two oncoming vehicles. 68 An assistant district attorney, called to
the scene, immediately learned that two occupants of one of the
oncoming vehicles had been injured, and later that evemng learned
that one of those injured had died.69 On the same evemng, Corbin
Lee, supra note 5, at 35 (emphasis added). Professor Thomas described the Vitale
analysis as "two-tiered," comprising the Blockburger "required evidence test as the thresh-
old determination and the necessary element test as the additional protection against a
second trial." Thomas, supra note 14, at 382.
63 Thomas, supra note 14, at 399 n.453.
Pandelli v. United States, 635 F.2d 533, 538 (6th Cir. 1980).
63 United States v. Brookfier, 637 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 980 (1981).
" Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Roberts v. Thigpen, 693
F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1982)).
' Justices Burger, Powell, and Stewart had left the Court, supplanted respectively by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1654 (6th ed. 1991).
Grady v. Corbin, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1990).
Id. at 2087-88. Assistant Distnct Attorney (ADA) Thomas Dolan gathered the
information at the scene of the accident. ADA Frank Chase prepared the homicide prose-
cution and ADA Mark Glick prosecuted the traffic offenses.
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received traffic tickets for two violations of New York's Vehicle
and Traffic Law- driving while intoxicated" and failure to keep
right of the median.7 1 Corbin pleaded guilty to both tickets on
October 27, 1987,72 resulting in a minimum sentence. 73
Meanwhile, on October 6, another assistant district attorney
began preparing a homicide prosecution arising from Corbin's
accident. He failed to inform anyone connected with the traffic
ticket prosecution of the investigation concerning the related death.74
The death went unmentioned in the traffic ticket prosecution's
pleadings, in court on October 27, and at the sentencing. 75
Three months later, after pleading guilty to the traffic offenses,
Corbin was indicted on homicide and assault charges stemming
from the October 3rd incident. 76 The prosecution stated that it
would rely on three reckless or negligent acts as proof: driving on
a public highway while intoxicated, failure to keep right of the
median, and driving too rapidly (45 to 50 miles per hour) in heavy
rain.77 The Court of Appeals of New York held that the prosecution
for homicide and assault violated the double jeopardy clause of
the United States Constitution as well as New York's statutory
double jeopardy provision. 78
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed. 79 In a 5-4
majority opinion, Justice Brennan announced the adoption of the
"same conduct" standard, holding that "the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government,
to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for
which the defendant has already been prosecuted." 80 Under the
new rule, if conduct x constitutes Offense I, for which a defendant
has been prosecuted, he cannot thereafter be prosecuted for Of-
"' See N.Y. VER. & Tr. LAW § 1192(3) (McKinney 1986).
71 See N.Y. VER. & TAF. LAw § i120(a) (McKinney 1986).
C orbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2088.
71 Id. at 2089.
7' Neither the court nor the assistant district attorney prosecuting the traffic offenses
was informed. Id. at 2088-89.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 2089.
7 id.
71 Corbin v. Hillery, 543 N.E.2d 714, 717 (N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision denying Corbin's petition
for a writ of prohibition.
79 Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2089-90.
" Id. at 2093.
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fense II (with elements A, B, and C) if the government relies on
proof of conduct x to establish A, B, or C.
The Court held that the dictum in Vitale, which stated that a
prior conviction "for conduct that is a necessary element of the
more serious crime ' 81 would occasion a "substantial" double jeop-
ardy claim, governed Corbin's case and barred his prosecution.82
The holding reaffirmed the obligation of "due diligence" on the
part of the state3 and again suggested the exception to the double
jeopardy bar in cases where the state exercises such diligence 4 No
due diligence was exerted here, the Court reasoned, m view of the
early knowledge by one assistant district attorney that a death had
occurred and the state's failure to act on that knowledge. s
The Court drew a sharp distinction between the new "conduct"
standard and a "true 'same evidence"' test. 6 "[Tihe presentation
of specific evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the gov-
ernment from introducing that same evidence in a subsequent
proceeding. On the other hand, a State cannot avoid [double
jeopardy] merely by altering in successive prosecutions the evidence
offered to prove the same conduct.' '87 The relevant factor under
the Corbin analysis is what conduct the government must prove,
not what items of evidence it will use to prove that conduct. Here,
the Court explained, the state had set forth m its pleadings that it
would "prove the entirety of the conduct for which Corbin was
convicted-driving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of
the median-to establish essential elements of the homicide and
assault offenses, 88 namely recklessness or negligence. 9
Id. at 2090 (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980)).
Since no statutory elements were identical, Blockburger alone could not bar Corbm's
prosecution. Id.
8' This obligation was earlier recognized in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7
(1977), as noted by the Corbin Court. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2090 n.7.
" Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2090 n.7.
"Id.
"True 'same evidence' is a term meant to distinguish the Blockburger test (some-
times called a "same evidence" test). Id. at 2093 n.12.
Id. at 2093.
"Id.
The Court noted that tins prosecution would not be barred if the bill of particulars
had asserted that the state would not rely on the same conduct, but rather on Corbm's
other conduct (driving too fast in heavy rain), to prove the element of recklessness or
negligence. See id. The Corbin holding is thereby distinguishable from the imposition of a
"single transaction" test, which would bar a prosecution framed as described. Id. at 2094
n.15.
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GRADY V. CORBIN
Grady v. Corbin" represents a clarification of the double jeop-
ardy standard and alleviates the confusion caused by conflicting
interpretations of Illinois v Vitale91 in the lower courts. 92 Further-
more, Corbin increases the power of the judiciary to define "same
offense" in individual cases, since the new standard, defendant's
"conduct," 93 is a matter determined in the courtroom rather than
on the legislative floor. A legislature can announce which conduct
it will prohibit in general, but the courts, independently of the
statutory-element scheme, decide when an individual may consti-
tutionally be prosecuted for that conduct in a fact-specific case.
Although this judicial empowerment reflects a separation of
powers somewhat analogous to the scheme of common-law offenses
and thus restores to the courts greater ability to protect the interests
served by the clause,94 the analogy is not perfect and it is arguable
that the double jeopardy interests are now overprotected. 95 In
addition, dissenting Justice O'Connor raises a question of how the
protections of Corbin interrelate with the element of collateral
estoppel in double jeopardy jurisprudence. 96 Finally Justice Scalia,
also in dissent, attacks the Corbin holding vigorously, warning that
the Court has in effect imposed a "same-transaction" test 97 and
urging a more precedent-rooted interpretation of the double jeop-
ardy clause. 9
A. The Function of Blockburger
In Corbin, the Court held unequivocally that Blockburger is
chiefly "a test to determine the permissibility of cumulative pun-
ishments." 99 That is to say, Blockburger is a rule of statutory
- - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
s 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
9 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
93 Grady v. Corbin, - U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2093 (1990). For a discussion
of the application of Corbin to multi-transactional crimes, see The Supreme Court-Leading
Cases, 104 HARv. L. Rnv. 129, 158 (1990) (advocating an exception, based on Garrett v.
United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), to Corbin for multi-transactional crimes, in view of
difficulty of fitting such crimes into the simple model of lesser included offenses). See also
United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Gonzalez, 921
F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that Corbmn does not affect the law on multi-transac-
tional crimes).
4See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
97See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
1S See infra note 141.
Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2091 n.8.
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construction rather than "the exclusive definition of 'same offense'
in the context of successive prosecutions."' 10 As such, Blockburger
becomes a preliminary inquiry, based on statutory elements, that
a subsequent prosecution must satisfy before the Corbin "conduct"
standard is applied. 10 1
Double jeopardy, therefore, can arise in two ways. First, the
prosecution can fail the Blockburger test because the arrangement
of statutory elements makes cumulative punishments or successive
prosecutions impermissible. Second, the prosecution can satisfy
Blockburger and still be barred because the same conduct which
was involved in a prior prosecution is to be proved. In Corbin,
Justice Brennan emphasized the difference between successive pro-
secutions and the mere multiple-punishment situation found in
Missouri v Hunter 102 As a rationale for imposing the further
inquiry into the defendant's conduct, Brennan observed the ineq-
uity of giving the state multiple opportunities to antagonize a
defendant' 3 or allowing the prosecution "to rehearse its presenta-
tion of proof, thus increasing the risk of an erroneous convic-
tion. "14
B. The Theoretical Integrity of Corbin
1. The Furthering of Protected Interests
The interests articulated in North Carolina v Pearce'0 5 and
subsequent cases receive a vital boost from the central holding of
'0 Id. Note 8 of the majority opinion lists eight cases on which the Scalia dissent relies
in its defense of the exclusivity of the Blockburger test, showing how each case treats
Blockburger merely as a rule for determimng legislative intent. See also id. at 2101 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (list of the eight cases offered to show traditional use of Blockburger for
"same offense"). The majority does not, however, address the fact that Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), on which Blockburger relies, was decided in the context of
successive prosecutions.
101 Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2090-93.
102 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
103 Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2091 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
114 Id. at 2091-92 (citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)). Justice Scalia finds
this rationale troublesome, pointing out that the same inequities obtain where "the second
prosecution seeks to prove some, rather than all of [the facts involved in the first convic-
tion]. if the Double Jeopardy Clause protects individuals against the necessity of
twice proving (or refuting) the same evidence, then the second prosecution should be
equally bad whether it contains all or merely some of the proof necessary for the first."
Id. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in onginal). Scalia believes the "rehearsal"
rationale is sufficiently vague to lead inevitably to an adoption, for practical purposes, of
the "same transaction" test that Justice Brennan could never persuade a majority of the
Court to adopt explicitly. See id. at 2102-04.
--3 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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Grady v. Corbn,1°6 which redefined "same offense" in the double
jeopardy clause to mean "same conduct." The protections "against
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal [or]
conviction"' 07 and "against multiple punishment for the same
offense"108 are ultimately the responsibility of the courts. 1°9 The
same is true of the "policy of finality"" 0 and that variety of
collateral estoppel which is addressed in Ashe v Swenson."' When
common-law offenses were the rule, the courts, as opposed to the
legislatures, had the task of defining the "offense." Courts, there-
fore, seldom had difficulty in faithfully implementing the double
jeopardy clause. The modern prevalence of statutory offenses,
however, poses a serious danger to the fifth amendment interests
because what the Framers would have understood as an "offense"
no longer exists.1 2
As the Court in Corbin finally confronts this change in the law
directly, one is reminded of the plight of Homer's Odysseus when,
"like a miserable beggar, an old man huddled in rags and leamng
upon a staff, the master returned to his own home' 3 to find his
house and his wife beset by interlopers. Just as it would be mala-
propos to let the suitors have their way with Penelope, the Court
would forsake its duty and constitutional role of implementing the
provisions of the Bill of Rights and insuring against their abuse if
it deferred to countless overlapping legislative definitions of offen-
ses. The ratifiers of the amendment could have foreseen neither
the modern prevalence of statutory offenses nor the disappearance
of the common-law approach. What the "same-conduct" standard
does is to restore, as nearly as possible, the courts' power to define
an "offense" for double jeopardy purposes.
2. A Proposed Exception Not Made
Grady v. Corbin may not provide for every interest worthy of
the law's protection. Some would argue that the decision falls to
1- 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
10, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
log Id.
I0 Although legislators arguably have a constitutional duty not to offend the double
jeopardy clause, it is in the court system that a defendant encounters the jeopardy and must
seek his remedy in the absence of statutory protection.
"0 United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
1 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
222 Though the exact understanding of the Framers is not apparent, the meaning is at
least so attenuated as to caution skepticism toward an exclusively "elements-based" analysis.
Cf. Thomas, supra note 14, at 399.
M, HoaMER, TE ODYSSEY 195 (W Rouse trans. 1937).
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vindicate the public interest in law enforcement.11 4 In Illinois v
Zegart,"5 the Court denied certiorari to a case with facts and a
holding essentially identical to those m Corbin. Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissented in Zegart,
insistmg that "[o]ur cases, particularly Vitale and Brown, require
the courts to look to the statutory elements of the first and second
charges, not to the similarities of facts in the government's proof."' 1 6
Burger called the Zegart case an "example of judicial analysis
carrying a sound principle beyond the outer limits of logic and
producing an irrational result.""17
At least one commentator shared Burger's desire to protect a
substantial law-enforcement interest and therefore advocated a so-
called "jurisdictional exception" to what would become the Corbin
rule."' This exception "could allow a second prosecution if it
proceeds in a different court [from] the first prosecution and if
neither court has jurisdiction over both charges."" 9 No such ex-
ception was carved out in Grady v Corbin. If it is "a miscarriage
of justice that a fine for a minor traffic offense would shield a
defendant from prosecution for homicide,' 120 such lmscarriages are
present in the broad wake of Corbin. It may also be a miscarriage
of historical analysis that this result should occur; the fact that the
double jeopardy clause applied only to felonies until 1873121 mili-
tates in favor of a jurisdiction-based exception to the Corbin
prosecution bar.
C. Challenges by the Corbin Dissenters
1. Justice O'Connor: Does Corbin Import a Lurking
Inconsistency 9
In her dissent,'2 Justice O'Connor finds Corbin inconsistent
with Dowling v United States,'2 a case decided less than five
"I See, e.g., Illinois v. Zegart, 452 U.S. 948, 951 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Thomas, supra note 14, at 388-89 (discussed infra in notes 115-21 and accompanying text).
"' 452 U.S. 948 (1981).
116 Zegart, 452 U.S. at 951 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
117 Id.
I8 See Thomas, supra note 14, at 389. See also Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as
a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 962, 976-77 (1980).
"9 Id.
' Id.
121 See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 172-73 (1873).
12 Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
M 493 U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).
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months earlier. She attacks the Corbin holding by pointing out an
inconsistency the Court generates even as it settles other conflicts
in the double jeopardy realm.iM In Dowling, a defendant was
acquitted on charges of burglary, attempted robbery, assault, and
weapons offenses arising from an incident in which a masked and
armed man had entered a woman's home.'2 The jury could not
identify Dowling as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. 26
Two weeks before the home burglary had occurred, a man similarly
masked and armed had robbed a bank in the same town. 27 At
Dowling's trial for that bank robbery, the government introduced
testimony from the woman in the earlier case, relating to the
appearance of the man who had entered her home. 28 Dowling
challenged the admission of the testimony, using the "collateral
estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause' '1 29 developed
in Ashe v Swenson."0 The Court distinguished A-she by noting
that Dowling's "pnor acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue
in the present case."'' In the evidentiary context m which this
testimony was introduced, the Court had previously held the stan-
dard for relevancy, and thus admissibility, to be whether "the jury
can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defen-
dant was the actor.' 32 Declinng to extend the fifth amendment
version of collateral estoppel to these facts, the Court in Dowling
held, consistent with precedent, 33 that "an acquittal in a criminal
case does not preclude the government from relitigating an issue
when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower
standard of proof.' '1 34
Justice O'Connor found the rule articulated in Corbin difficult
to reconcile with the outcome of Dowling.'3 1 If the same fact
,24 Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
MZ Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 1, , 0 S. Ct. 668, 670 (1990).
'26 Id. at 672.
,27 Id. at 670.
"' Id. The evidence was introduced under FED. R. Evm. 404(b).
12 Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 672.
230 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
" Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 672.
132 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
'" See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
11 Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 672.
"' Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Dowling was decided over
a bitter dissent by Justice Brennan, who accused the Court of "ignoring the pnnciples upon
which the collateral estoppel doctnne is based." See Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 680 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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situation as in Dowling were to arise today, "a conscientious judge
attempting to apply [Corbin] would probably conclude that the
witness' testimony was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause." ''3 6
The evidence, after all, related to establishing Dowling's identity,
"'an essential element of an offense charged in [the subsequent]
prosecution,' [and] the testimony would likely 'prove conduct that
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted."'1 37
It is difficult to surmount the inconsistency Justice O'Connor
brings to light if one assumes the "collateral estoppel component,"
as "a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy,"' 38 expands the scope of that protection. 39 The protec-
tion afforded by collateral estoppel in Dowling seems quite small
in comparison with the breadth of the Corbin holding. It may be,
as Chief Justice Burger intimated in dissent,'14 that Ashe v Swen-
son was merely an activist decision, contrived to reach a desired
result in a particular case. If Burger is correct, the combined
holdings of Dowling and Corbin may represent the modern Court's
attempt to eliminate some constitutional dead weight by rendering
the "collateral estoppel component" unnecessary to double jeop-
ardy protection. Since the Corbin shield makes it unlikely that any
defendant will now invoke collateral estoppel, the Court will prob-
ably succeed in evading a direct examination of whatever differ-
ences exist between collateral estoppel and "other" double jeopardy
principles.
2. Justice Scalia: Is the Corbin Holding More than It Seems?
The dissent of Justice Scalia, which is joined by Justices Rehn-
quist and Kennedy, makes an effort to characterize the Corbin
'1 Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137 Id.
238 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442 (1970).
3' Though the "collateral estoppel component" expanded the scope of protection in
Ashe, it appears to narrow that scope in Dowling if Corbin is taken as the starting point.
Writing for the Corbin majority, even Justice Brennan does not address the implicit
inconsistency. He merely explains that the Corbin test is not an "actual evidence" test and
cites the reader to Dowling without explanation, further stating that "[a]s we have held,
the presentation of specific evidence in one trial does not forever prevent the government
from introducing that same evidence in a subsequent proceeding." Corbm, 110 S. Ct. at
2093.
Justice O'Connor's dissent also raises concerns about the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which are not within the scope of this Comment. For a brief discussion of the effect of
Corbin on the reintroduction of evidence, see The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra
note 93, at 157.
110 Ashe, 397 U.S. at 464 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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holding as an activist decision without legal or historical support.141
On the contrary, the majority draws its conclusions logically from
precedent without serious leaps of faith, 142 arriving at a rule that
at least one commentator believes is compelled by both Illinois v.
Vitale'43 and the historical principle embodied in the fifth amend-
ment.'4"
Aside from that generalized misgiving and the contentions pre-
viously discussed, 145 Justice Scalia's opimon raises some important
questions about Corbin. These questions center around whether
the principle will in practical effect impose the very "same trans-
action" test the Court has for so long rejected.'" As one example
of how "same conduct" would function as "same transaction,"
Scalia offers a prosecution for burglary followed by a prosecution
for murder occurring in the course of that burglary "In the second
trial the State will prove (if it can) that the defendant was engaged
in a burglary-not because that is itself an element of the murder
charge, but because by providing a motive for intentional killing
it will be persuasive that murder occurred."' 147 Thus, Scalia con-
cludes, proof of the burglary would cause the prosecution to violate
the fifth amendment under the Corbin rule.
Corbin does not actually mandate Scalia's hypothetical result.
Justice Scalia appears to ignore the majority's reliance on the fact
that in Corbin the state alleged in the pleadings that it would use
proof of the conduct for which Corbin had been convicted to
establish recklessness or negligence.'4 This fact would be immate-
rial to a "same transaction" test, since that test would be broad
enough to bar the second prosecution even if the state did not rely
on the already-prosecuted conduct to establish elements of the
-' "The Court today [is] departing from clear text and clear precedent with no
justification " Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "The principle the
Court adopts today [is] radically out of line with our double jeopardy jurisprudence "
Id. at 2102 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1' "The values [an activist] judge enforces do not, of course, come from the law.
A judge inserting new principles into the Constitution tells us their origin only in a rhetorical,
never an analytical, style." R. BoaR, Tim TEmpTiNG oF AMRICA: Tim PoImcAL SEnucTioN
oF TBE LAW 16 (1990).
'3 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
'" Cf. Thomas, supra note 14, at 399. "The need for a conduct-based test is acute in
today's world of overlapping and duplicative criminal statutes." In fact, Thomas would
create an exception to what is now the Corbin rule for just such a fact situation as occurred
in Corbin itself. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 61, 100 and 104 and accompanying text.
I" See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
147 Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2103 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
I" Id. at 2094.
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offense.149 Furthermore, "motive" is not an element of a crime,
and that which is "persuasive" that a crime occurred is not always
that which is necessary to establish an element of the offense.
In short, Justice Scalia fails to distinguish conduct required to
be proved from conduct actually proved, the latter of which is not
explicitly addressed in the majority opimon. This distinction, when
recognized, tends to nullify the likelihood of the procedural "role-
reversal" he envisions in trial practice1 50 along with his other fears.' 5'
Most of Justice Scalia's objections in Corbin amount to mere
specters of what future decisions he suspects the Court will make
toward adopting the "same transaction" test. He imagines, for
example, that Corbin will soon be extended to find double jeopardy
wherever evidence in a second prosecution tends to establish an
element of a previously prosecuted offense. Scalia declares that
"[t]he Court that has done what it has done today should
find this lesser transmogrification easy." 152 Convinced that the
integrity of double jeopardy analysis has gone out the window,
Justice Scalia gives vent to rabid fears of inchoate judicial activ-
ism. 5
3
Other concerns Scalia expresses in Corbin tend to reflect an
inclination toward the original understanding5 4 of "same offense,"
141 Id. at 2094 n.15.
110 "Suppose [that on remand] defense counsel asks the witness on cross-examination,
'When you said the defendant's vehicle was "weaving back and forth," did you mean
weaving back and forth across the center line?'-to which the witness replies yes. Will this
self-inflicted wound count for purposes of determing what the prosecution has "proved"?
If so, can the prosecution then seek to impeach its own witness by showing that his
recollection of the vehicle's crossing the center line was inaccurate? Mhe prosecutor
in the second trial will presumably seek to introduce as much evidence as he can without
crossing that line [of 'proving' the prior offense], and the defense attorney will presumably
seek to provoke the prosecutor into (or assist him in) proving the defendant guilty of the
earlier crane. This delicious role-reversal, discovered to have been mandated by the Double
Jeopardy Clause lo these 200 years, makes for high comedy but infenor justice." Id. at
2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"I Justice Scalia anticipates judicial determinations at the conclusion of trial as to
whether particular conduct "'has been proved' (whatever that means)." Id. at 2104 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). No such procedure is overtly required by Corbin.
112 Id. at 2105 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's hypothetical holding is distinguishable
from the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.
1990). In that case, a prosecution for a "smaller" conspiracy followed an acquittal on
another charge of a larger conspiracy. The government argued that since the actual agree-
ment to distribute narcotics constituted the "offense" already prosecuted, it was not a
double jeopardy violation to re-prove conduct from which that agreement could be inferred,
so long as the agreement was not proved directly. The court rejected this argument, noting
that conspiracy is almost never proved by direct evidence and that the government's
formulation recast Corbin as merely "an alternative formulation of Blockburger" Calde-
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a formulation that would "permit a prosecution based upon the
same acts but for a different crime."' 5 5 His long historical
discussion'56 may be occasioned by a similar motivation to maintain
as close a temporal mooring as possible to that interpretation of
the double jeopardy clause. Such a desire is misguided, however,
in view of the fact noted by the Ashe Court that "at common law
. offense categories were relatively few and distinct. . [Later]
it became possible for prosecutors to spin out a startlingly numer-
ous series of offenses from a single alleged criminal transaction.' ' 57
In order to protect the original interests involved to the original
extent, it is necessary, when "offense" evolves away from a mean-
ing synonymous with "conduct,' 1 58 to protect those interests by
analyzing "conduct" instead. 59
CONCLUSION
As a matter of pure theoretical soundness, the ruling in Grady
v Corbin makes reasonably coherent legal sense out of the existing
precedent. Justice Scalia's fears that the "same conduct" test can-
not be implemented are ill-founded in view of the express limita-
rone, 917 F.2d at 721. The prosecution had relied on already-proved conduct to establish
the entirety of the already-prosecuted offense (conspiring to distribute heroin), and hence
the second prosecution constituted double jeopardy. Compare United States v. Clark, 928
F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1991) (conspiracy prosecution followed a conviction for possession of
drugs with intent to distribute; prior conviction held not to bar conspiracy prosecution
because conduct of possession did not constitute entirety of an element of crime of con-
spiracy, but merely tended to prove an element).
1' The retirement of Justice Brennan, the staunchest advocate of the "same transac-
tion" test, has reduced the likelihood that Scalia's fears will come to pass. However, Scalia's
predictions are exceedingly speculative regardless of Brennan's presence or absence.
' Justice Scalia has undergone a recent shift toward "original understanding" juns-
prudence, if his writings on substantive due process are any indication. Compare Michael
H. v. Gerald D., - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989) ("It is an established
part of our constitutional jurisprudence that the term 'liberty' in the Due Process Clause
extends beyond freedom from physical restraint.") with Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2752 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (an almost
mocking reference to "so-called 'substantive due process' claims"). For a concise explana-
tion of "original understanding" jurisprudence, see R. BoRK, supra note 142, at 143-60.
"' Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2098-2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 n.10. For a brief but specific criticism of Justice Scalia's
historical analysis, see The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 93, at 154-55.
I" This is not to assert that the original understanding of "offense" was exactly
synonymous with "conduct," but merely that the directional trend in the development of
the law has been away from such synonymy.
119 See Thomas, supra note 14, at 399.
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tions contained in the Corbin holding. On the whole, the case
begins to alleviate the confusion in a doctrinal area once described
by Justice Rehnquist as a "Sargasso Sea."' ' 60 Corbin settles a
dispute among the circuit courts 6' as to the level of double jeop-
ardy protection afforded by the rule in Vitale, providing a much-
needed uniformity in the application of the clause. From a stand-
point of coherence and convemence, Corbin appears to pass jund-
ical muster.
Due to the breadth of Corbin's protection, it is unlikely that
the unreconciled variance with the rule in Dowling will force further
clarification on the collateral-estoppel issue. However, widespread
dissatisfaction with the practical result (e.g., that paying a minor
traffic fine can avert a homicide prosecution) will possibly lead to
the carving out of exceptions to the general bar to prosecution
articulated in Corbin. The basic rule is likely to prevail nonetheless,
since only a "same conduct" standard can adequately protect
defendants against potential legislative abuse of the power to define
offenses. With "conduct" as the guide, the double jeopardy clause
can more thoroughly embody the practical protections it was meant
to afford.
James M. Herrick
161 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
161 See Thomas, supra note 14, at 399 n.453.
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